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How Does Positive Reinforcement Accountability Mitigate the Innovation-Inhibiting Effect of Negative Reinforcement Accountability?

Siqi Ma
Vol.10, No.9, pp.8-21, 2026 DOI: 10.62051/ijsspa.v10n9.02 September 28, 2026
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Abstract: Accountability is a central institutional mechanism shaping whether grassroots civil servants engage in reform and innovation. Yet existing research has largely examined individual accountability types or components in isolation, leaving the configurational effects of different accountability elements underexplored. Treating accountability as an overarching institutional construct, this study distinguishes positive reinforcement accountability from negative reinforcement accountability and examines how their joint configuration shapes innovative behavioral intention. We conduct a 2 × 2 between-subjects vignette-based survey experiment with 240 respondents pre-screened for relevant grassroots public-sector work experience and test risk preference as a moderator. The results show, first, that positive reinforcement accountability significantly increases innovative behavioral intention, whereas negative reinforcement accountability exerts an overall inhibitory effect. The effect size for positive reinforcement accountability (η² = 0.467) is approximately 8.34 times that for negative reinforcement accountability (η² = 0.056). Second, the two dimensions interact significantly: high positive reinforcement accountability substantially attenuates the inhibitory effect of high negative reinforcement accountability. Third, risk preference significantly moderates this interaction. The interaction is significant among respondents with high risk preference (F = 34.96, p < 0.001) but not among those with low risk preference (F = 1.11, p > 0.05). Taken together, the findings show that the behavioral consequences of grassroots accountability depend not simply on the strength of constraints, but on how support and incentives are configured alongside monitoring and sanctions.
Keywords: Accountability Mechanism, Positive Reinforcement Accountability, Negative Reinforcement Accountability, Innovative Behavioral Intention
APA Citation: Siqi Ma (2026). How Does Positive Reinforcement Accountability Mitigate the Innovation-Inhibiting Effect of Negative Reinforcement Accountability?. International Journal of Social Sciences and Public Administration, 10(9), 8-21. https://doi.org/10.62051/ijsspa.v10n9.02

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