

Appointment Logic for the Inaugural Leaders of Newly Established Public Sectors: A Study based on Prefectural Emergency Management Bureaus in China

Wenbo Guo

School of Public Administration, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610000, China

ABSTRACT

Throughout China's successive rounds of institutional reform, the establishment of new agencies reflects the developmental characteristics and future directions of the public sector in different periods. The appointment logic for inaugural leaders has emerged as a critical issue. This study analyzes information concerning the inaugural directors of prefectural Emergency Management Bureaus (EMBs) in China. The findings reveal that older male local officials are more likely to be appointed as inaugural EMB directors, with the Han ethnicity constituting the overwhelming majority. In ethnic regions, minority officials are appointed based on local circumstances. To ensure stable management during the initial establishment phase, an overwhelming majority of these inaugural directors are members of the Communist Party of China. To ensure the overall quality of inaugural directors, officials with a bachelor's degree or higher are generally selected, although educational attainment is not the primary determining factor. Officials with relevant prior work experience are more likely to be appointed. Furthermore, due to the urgency of institutional reform and the unique nature of emergency system operations, the tenure of inaugural EMB directors is shorter than the average tenure for directors of pre-existing departments.

KEYWORDS

Newly Established Public Sectors; Inaugural Leaders; Emergency Management Bureau Director.

1. INTRODUCTION

Since the inception of reform and opening-up, the Chinese government has undergone nine rounds of institutional restructuring. Through periodic, top-down reforms ^[1], the organizational structure and functional allocation of the government have been continually optimized, progressively advancing the modernization of national governance ^[2]. Over more than forty years of reform, an underlying "integration logic" has consistently guided the process. Successive reforms have consolidated functions previously dispersed across several related departments into single agencies, thereby enhancing administrative efficiency ^[3]. Under the "integration logic", some institutions were abolished as they no longer met the needs of the times; others were adjusted or restructured due to shifts in their functions; and still others were newly established in response to the imperative of modernizing national governance. Among these, newly established departments reflect the future direction of institutional reform and consequently attract significant attention from both society and academia ^[4]. Leader selection and appointment constitute critical factors influencing organizational performance ^[5], with their importance being heightened in the context of the public sectors. The complex and dynamic social environment, along with growing public expectations, places higher demands on public sector leaders ^[6]. However, there is scant research focusing on the selection of inaugural leaders for newly established public sectors, leaving their appointment logic largely

unexplored. For a newly created government agency, the choice of its inaugural leader not only signals the importance attached to it by higher-level authorities but also crucially affects whether the agency can achieve stable operations in its initial phase.

The 2018 government restructuring represents the most extensive institutional reform since reform and opening-up began. In this round of reform, China for the first time established the Ministry of Emergency Management as a full-fledged ministry. By integrating 13 responsibilities from 11 departments and 5 national leading coordinating bodies, it directly addressed the chronic problem of fragmented responsibilities - the “small horse pulling a heavy cart” dilemma - in emergency management.^[7] This major institutional reform aligns with the evolving needs of the holistic national security framework and marks a new stage in the development of China’s emergency management system^[8]. While existing literature has focused overwhelmingly on macro facets like historical context and institutional challenges, the micro-level perspective of leadership appointment remains markedly underexplored. Furthermore, the emergency response function inherent in the role presents its inaugural leader with the defining challenge of demonstrating competent crisis management from the outset.

Therefore, within the context of China's 2018 government restructuring, this study focuses on the appointment of inaugural leaders in newly established emergency management departments. It aims to preliminarily summarize the appointment logic for inaugural leaders of newly established public sectors, thereby offering insights for future institutional reforms and leadership appointments within the Chinese government.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Research on the China's 2018 Government Institutional Reform.

In the study of the China’s 2018 Government Institutional Reform, the first approach involves examining various aspects of newly established government departments. Taking the emergency management department as an example, scholars have explored this entirely new government entity within the broader context of institutional reform, investigating its foundational values, organizational structure, institutional transformation, practical challenges, and strategic responses. Overall, the restructuring of the emergency management department embodies the state’s commitment to the Holistic Approach to National Security, which emphasizes balancing development and security^[9]. It signifies China's progression toward an integrated disaster reduction model characterized by "all-hazards coverage and major emergency response"^[10]. However, structural tensions remain between the department's intended functions and its actual institutional design^[11], with the system grappling with issues such as fragmentation across disaster types, imbalanced attention to different phases of emergency management, and limited effectiveness of multi-stakeholder participation^[12]. Therefore, advancing the modernization of the emergency management system and capabilities requires careful balancing of integration and decentralization, prevention and response, and central and local authorities.^[13]

The second strand of research uses specific newly established public sectors as case studies to examine common issues emerging from the reform process. For instance, Fu taking the Ministry of Natural Resources as an example, argue that this round of central government reform represents a return to a power-centric approach, aiming to achieve modernized national governance through functional integration^[14]. From the perspective of the Ministry of Ecology and Environment's restructuring, Wang proposed that managing the relationship between administrative costs and performance in government departments should focus on enhancing quality and efficiency. This involves categorized control of departmental administrative costs and the establishment of a scientific management system for them^[15]. As government institutional reform is a top-down, tiered process, Jiang first analyzed the trends, regional variations, and underlying logic of local institutional reforms

^[16]. Subsequently, Shi innovatively connected central and local reforms. Through a case study of the merger of culture and tourism departments, he revealed the cross-level linkage effects and complex logic in government restructuring, providing empirical evidence for understanding reforms across different administrative levels ^[17].

Existing research has extensively studied fundamental questions about newly established public sector organizations, such as their nature, rationale for creation, subsequent challenges, and optimization strategies, aiming to extrapolate general patterns from individual cases. However, it has not sufficiently emphasized their distinct status as newly created entities. The primary distinction of this study lies in situating the establishment of emergency management departments within the broader context of national institutional reform. By investigating the appointment logic of their inaugural leaders, this research aims to identify transferable insights applicable to the selection of first leaders in other newly established departments in China, thereby offering a reference for future reform practices.

2.2. Research on Official Appointments in China.

The bulk of scholarly attention on official appointments in China has been directed at leading Party and government officials. A classic line of inquiry examines the impact of government performance on promotion. Since the "Promotion Tournament Theory" was introduced by Zhou^[18], numerous scholars have employed diverse samples to test its validity. This body of work has not only explored the links between promotion and performance in areas such as economic growth ^[19-20], environmental protection ^[21-22], social welfare improvement ^[23-24], social stability ^[25-26], and government innovation ^[27-28] but has also indirectly revealed appointment and removal patterns for top leaders at provincial, prefectural, and county levels. Furthermore, some studies have investigated specific factors influencing promotion. For example, Lee suggested that, assuming a baseline of political loyalty, officials with higher technical competence have a greater chance of promotion ^[29]. Conversely, Liu through a conjoint experiment with over 300 Chinese officials, found that political connections can be as significant as loyalty and competence ^[30]. Nonetheless, the primary focus of these studies remains promotion mechanisms rather than the underlying logic of initial appointments.

Another subset of research examines appointment patterns for leaders of specific government departments. From a professionalization perspective, Zhu analyzed the career paths of 211 heads of health departments ^[31]. Liu studied the appointment characteristics of prefectural Environmental Protection Bureau directors and discussed their implications for environmental governance ^[32]. Cai was among the first to focus on leadership within emergency management departments. By analyzing a sample of 2,238 officials from 293 prefectural EMBs, they explored the collective profile and appointment patterns of these leaders ^[33]. However, their study did not specifically uncover the appointment logic for the inaugural leaders of these bureaus, which were established under a major institutional reform. Over five years have passed since the widespread establishment of local EMBs, and their "newness" has gradually diminished. Analyzing the entire cohort of their leaders inevitably obscures the distinct appointment logic that applied to their inaugural leaders under those special circumstances. Research focusing specifically on the administrative heads is better suited to reveal the particular considerations of higher-level governments when selecting leaders for a newly established agency. Moreover, other studies on leadership cadres mainly emphasize the importance of competency development ^[34-35], competency frameworks ^[36-37], and team-building approaches ^[38], without delving into the level of leaders' personal attributes. To address these gaps, this study adopts a micro-level perspective centered on officials within a single department. It aims to investigate the appointment logic for the inaugural leaders of China's emergency management departments, with the goal of providing empirical insights for appointing the first leaders of other newly established public sectors.

3. DATA SOURCES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

In February 2018, the Third Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee was convened, during which it reviewed and adopted the Decision on Deepening the Reform of Party and State Institutions and its matching Plan (hereinafter the Plan). The documents explicitly proposed the establishment of the Ministry of Emergency Management. The ministry was officially inaugurated in April of the same year. As stipulated by the Plan, local institutional reforms were required to fully implement the central Party leadership's decisions and arrangements, with all major tasks scheduled for completion by the end of March 2019. Over the following year, people's governments at the county level and above correspondingly established their own emergency management departments, thereby forming a complete organizational system spanning from central to local levels. Regarding the appointment of inaugural leaders for these departments, candidates were generally nominated by relevant leading officials and Party committee organization departments at each corresponding administrative level, based on operational needs and drawn from a pool of qualified cadres. The nominated candidates then required approval through a vote by the standing committee of the people's congress at the same level before formally assuming leadership of the local emergency management department. Given data availability, this study focuses on the inaugural directors of prefectural EMBs across China as its research subjects. Data on their personal backgrounds and career histories were collected from government websites, news reports, BaiduBaiké, and other publicly available sources. After cleaning, coding, and processing the collected data, a sample database of these inaugural directors was constructed to serve as the basis for a quantitative analysis of their appointment logic.

Building upon established literature on official appointments, personal attributes-including gender, age, place of origin, ethnicity, political affiliation, and educational background-are recognized as significant factors in the selection of cadres by higher-level governments. Moreover, given the technical and specialized nature of emergency management, prior relevant professional experience also plays a crucial role in the appointment of inaugural directors of EMBs. In addition, tenure length can serve as an ex post indicator of appointment patterns.

In light of these considerations, this study examines eight variables: gender, age, native place, ethnicity, political affiliation, educational background, relevant work experience, and tenure. Owing to disparities in information disclosure across local governments, career records were incomplete for some inaugural directors of prefectural EMBs. Table 1 summarizes the sample distribution of these directors in China.

The collective profile of the inaugural directors of China's prefectural EMBs is characterized by a predominance of local male officials around 50 years of age. Nearly 90% are of Han ethnicity, and the overwhelming majority are members of the Chinese Communist Party. Educational background is generally high, with over 95.2% holding at least a bachelor's degree. In terms of relevant work experience, more than 70% of the directors had prior work experience in institutions such as the State Administration of Work Safety, the Emergency Management Commission, the Earthquake Administration, Government Emergency Offices, Public Security Fire Departments, Water Resources Bureaus, Forestry Bureaus, or the military. Regarding tenure, the average term served by these inaugural directors is approximately two and a half years. A detailed descriptive analysis of each variable follows.

Table 1. Sample Distribution of Inaugural Directors of Prefectural EMBs in China

Variable	Variable Description	Observed Value	Category	Frequency	Percentage(%)	
Gender	Male = 1, Female = 0	305	1	302	99.02	
			0	3	0.98	
Place of Origin	Local origin = 1, Non-local origin = 0	190	1	173	91.05	
			0	17	8.95	
Ethnicity	Han = 1, Ethnic Minorities = 0	203	1	180	88.67	
			0	23	11.33	
Political Affiliation	Member of CCP = 1, Other political affiliations= 0	245	1	241	98.37	
			0	4	1.63	
Educational Background	Junior college and below = 1, Bachelor's degree= 2, Master's degree = 3, Doctoral degree = 4	212	1	10	4.72	
			2	120	56.60	
			3	78	36.79	
			4	4	1.89	
Relevant Work Experience	Experience in positions related to the State Administration of Work Safety, the Emergency Management Commission, the Earthquake Administration, Government Emergency Offices, Public Security Fire Departments, Water Resources Bureaus, Forestry Bureaus, or the military = 1, otherwise, it was coded as 0.	263	1	196	74.52	
			0	67	25.48	
Variable	Variable Description	Observed Value	Mean	Standard Deviation	Maximum	Minimum
Age (years)	Age at Appointment as Emergency Management Bureau Director	196	50.79	3.97	58	34
Tenure (months)	Tenure as Director of the Emergency Management Bureau	172	31.89	14.32	66	4

3.1. Personal Characteristics.

Among the inaugural directors of prefectural EMBs in China, over 99% are male, indicating an overwhelming male dominance. Only the directors in Sanming City (Fujian Province), Heze City (Shandong Province), and Dingxi City (Gansu Province) are female. This gender imbalance may be attributed to the nature of emergency management work, which often involves urgency and operational risks, thereby placing a premium on the physical stamina and psychological resilience of its leaders. Notably, two of the three female directors had previously served as directors of local State Administration of Work Safety, a relevant background that likely contributed to their appointments.

In this study, directors whose native place is within the same province are classified as local officials. As shown, approximately 91% of the directors are locally sourced, which may be due to their familiarity with local conditions. A similar pattern is observed in ethnic distribution: 11% of the directors are from ethnic minority groups, and these are predominantly concentrated in provinces or autonomous regions with significant minority populations. This reflects the consideration given by higher authorities to the specific social contexts of ethnic minority areas.

Regarding political affiliation, over 98% of the inaugural directors are members of the Chinese Communist Party, with members of other political affiliations constituting less than 2%. This reflects the Bureau's distinct governance model of "director responsibility under the leadership of the Party," which helps ensure unified authority and facilitates stable operations during the initial phase of the department's establishment.

The average age of the inaugural directors is 50.79 years, with the majority concentrated between 53 and 55 years. The youngest director is 34 years old (Xinyu City, Jiangxi Province), while the oldest are 58 years old (Yingkou City, Liaoning Province, and Harbin City, Heilongjiang Province). The most common age is 55, represented by 27 directors. A minor peak occurs at age 45, with 11 officials appointed at this age, suggesting that 45 may be a noteworthy threshold for appointments within the emergency management system. Overall, the age distribution indicates a tendency toward appointing relatively older officials as inaugural directors of newly established EMBs. This pattern underscores the importance placed on experience and stability in leadership selection for new government agencies, although there remain instances where exceptionally capable younger officials are appointed.

3.2. Educational Background.

Regarding educational background, among the inaugural directors of China's prefectural EMBs, 95.2% hold at least a bachelor's degree, with over one-third having earned a master's degree or higher. This reflects a generally high level of education among the cohort. However, only four individuals possess a doctoral degree, underscoring the scarcity of top-tier talent within the nation's first cohort of emergency management directors.




Fig. 1 Educational Background of the Inaugural Directors of Prefectural EMBs in China

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3.3. Relevant Work Experience.

Examining the prior work experience of China's inaugural prefecture-level Emergency Management Bureau (EMB) directors, over 70% had relevant work backgrounds. This is closely tied to the mandate of the newly established EMBs, which consolidated the functions and responsibilities of multiple predecessor agencies, including the State Administration of Work Safety, the Emergency Management Commission, the China Earthquake Administration, Government Emergency Offices, and Public Security Fire Departments. Since the EMB fully absorbed the duties of the former State Administration of Work Safety, experience within the work safety system provides significant operational grounding for inaugural directors. Furthermore, the public security sector serves as another key source of EMB directors, accounting for 6.3% of the sample. Officials with public security backgrounds typically possess substantial experience in handling social stability incidents and public emergencies, which equips them with strong adaptive capabilities and stress resilience-attributes highly pertinent to emergency management leadership.




Fig. 2 Relevant Work Experience of the Inaugural Directors of Prefectural EMBs in China

3.4. Tenure.

Beyond key profiling dimensions such as personal characteristics, educational background, and relevant experience, the tenure length of the inaugural directors also serves as a retroactive indicator of appointment patterns. On average, these inaugural directors served for 31.89 months, with the shortest tenure being 4 months. Notably, twelve directors have remained in their posts since their bureaus were established. Setting aside those still in office, the distribution of tenures shows a gradual decline on both sides of a 30-month threshold. Among the twelve who have served since inception, three each are from prefecture-level cities in Henan and Hebei provinces, suggesting that these provinces placed a higher priority on leadership continuity from the outset. Overall, directors who remain in office constitute only about 7% of the total sample. Generally, a longer tenure indicates a better fit between the appointed official and the position at the agency's founding, and the accumulated experience is more beneficial for organizational development. Therefore, a separate analysis of the characteristics of these twelve incumbents is warranted.




Fig. 3 Tenure of the Inaugural Directors of Prefectural EMBs in China

Regarding their personal profiles, all twelve are male; one is a non-local official; two belong to ethnic minorities; and one is a member of a democratic party. All hold at least a bachelor's degree, with five holding master's degrees. Their average age at appointment was 50.3 years, slightly below the full-sample average. In terms of professional origin, three and four directors came from the work safety supervision system and the public security system, respectively. A comparative analysis with the full sample suggests that inaugural directors who are relatively younger, better educated, and have emergency-management-related experience tend to have longer tenures.

4. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INAUGURAL DIRECTORS OF PREFECTURAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT BUREAUS IN CHINA

Table 2. Comparative Analysis of Characteristics Between Inaugural Directors of Prefectural EMBs and Other Officials in China

Comparative Study (%)	Gender		Place of Origin		Ethnic Minority		Member of CCP		Education Background				Age (Years)			Tenure (Months)		
	Male	Female	Local	No-local	Yes	No	Yes	No	1	2	3	4	Min	Mean	Max	Min	Mean	Max
Director of Emergency Management Bureau	99.0	1.0	91.0	9.0	88.7	11.3	98.4	1.6	4.8	57.7	35.6	1.9	50.8	34.0	58.0	31.9	4.0	66.0
Mayor (Wu et al., 2013)	95.7	4.3	/	/	94.2	5.8	/	/	30.8		69.2		52.9	40.0	64.0	47.7	12.0	132.0
Director of Environmental Protection Bureau (Liu et al., 2022)	96.0	4.0	59.61	40.39	91.0	9.0	97.9	2.1	3.9	51.4	40.3	4.4	48.2	31.0	58.8	49.2	4.0	250.0
Director of Health Commission (Zhu, 2018)	71.6	28.4	/	/	/	/	89.0	11.0	2.4	43.3	45.2	9.1	/	37.0	60.0	/	/	/

A thorough examination of the inaugural leaders of newly established public sectors should not be confined to the department itself; rather, it ought to be situated within the broader landscape of the official cadre in order to bring into sharper relief the distinctive logic underlying their appointments. Existing scholarship on prefectural officials has predominantly centered on the promotion dynamics of municipal Party secretaries and mayors, while only a limited number of studies have focused on profiling officials at the bureau - chief level. In this context, a salient question emerges: what

characteristics distinguish the inaugural directors of prefectural EMBs in China when compared with other officials?

Table 2 presents a comparative analysis of the key characteristics of China's inaugural prefectural Emergency Management Bureau (EMB) directors alongside those of other officials. Relative to mayors, directors of Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPB), and directors of Health Bureaus, the gender composition of inaugural EMB directors is markedly imbalanced, with males comprising over 99%. Although female representation among mayors, EPB directors, and Health Bureau directors remains low (approximately 4%), the near-exclusive male dominance among inaugural EMB directors is closely linked to the distinctive professional demands of emergency management. In terms of native-place composition, inaugural EMB directors differ substantially from their EPB counterparts: 91% of EMB directors are locally born, compared to 59.1% of EPB directors. This disparity may be attributed to two factors. First, during the initial phase of a new government agency's establishment, officials familiar with local conditions may be preferred to ensure stable operations. Second, local officials often possess richer social networks and are more readily trusted by both superior authorities and the public, making them likely candidates for leading a newly formed department such as the EMB. Regarding ethnic composition, the selection of inaugural EMB directors mirrors that of EPB directors: Han Chinese account for about 90%, while ethnic minorities constitute roughly 10%. In contrast, the proportion of Han Chinese among mayors is slightly higher, reflecting the broader set of considerations involved in mayoral appointments. As for political affiliation, the share of Chinese Communist Party members among inaugural EMB directors is on par with that of EPB directors, whereas Health Bureau directors exhibit a slightly lower rate of Party membership. In educational background, both EPB and Health Bureau directors possess master's degrees or higher at slightly higher rates than inaugural EMB directors. Mayors, whose roles demand broader comprehensive capabilities, show a significantly higher proportion holding master's degrees or above, reaching 69.2%.

In terms of age, the average appointment age of inaugural EMB directors is 50.8 years, somewhat higher than that of EPB directors but lower than that of mayors. This pattern suggests a tendency to appoint older, more experienced officials to lead newly established public departments, while keeping their age within a reasonable range that does not exceed that of higher-ranking officials.

Finally, concerning tenure, the average term of inaugural EMB directors is over one year shorter than that of both EPB directors and mayors. This relatively brief tenure reflects the transitional nature of leadership appointments in newly created public departments, where the immediate goal is to identify a suitable leader quickly, with subsequent adjustments made based on the organization's operational needs. This also explains why the shortest tenure among inaugural EMB directors was only 4 months. Appointment Logic for the Inaugural Directors of Prefectural Emergency Management Bureaus in China

Analysis of the personal profiles and career histories of the inaugural directors of China's prefectural EMBs suggests that the appointment of first leaders for newly established public sector organizations may follow the logic outlined below.

First, regarding personal characteristics, the analysis reveals distinct patterns in gender, place of origin, and political affiliation. In terms of gender, appointments are predominantly male. This tendency can be attributed to both the ingrained organizational culture and historical conventions within the bureaucratic system, which may lead to men being more frequently recommended for pioneering leadership roles. Furthermore, the technically demanding and high-risk nature of emergency management work creates an initial preference for candidates with specific professional expertise, a profile historically more common among male officials, which contributes to the pronounced gender disparity. Regarding native place, higher-level authorities show a stronger preference for appointing local officials as inaugural EMB directors compared to appointments in established departments. This likely stems from local officials' deeper understanding of regional

conditions, which enables more effective responses to local disasters. Additionally, within China's local political context, appointing a local to head a new department facilitates greater support from local governments and communities, fostering smoother collaboration and thereby enhancing operational effectiveness. Politically, the overwhelming majority of appointees are members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This reflects the Party's leadership as a fundamental principle ensuring the work of government departments.

Second, regarding educational background, officials holding at least a bachelor's degree are typically considered for the role of inaugural EMB director, ensuring a generally well-qualified cohort. However, the proportion of holders of advanced degrees is not particularly prominent compared to officials in established departments. This indicates that educational attainment, while a baseline requirement, is not a primary differentiating factor in appointing officials to newly established agencies.

Third, appointments tend to favor relatively older officials in terms of age, generally not exceeding the typical age range for officials at higher administrative levels. This preference is based on considerations of professional maturity, policy stability, and leadership capability. Emergency management work demands extensive practical experience and competency in handling crises, and it concerns public safety and social stability, requiring high policy continuity. Older officials are perceived to possess richer experience and leadership skills, enabling them to better coordinate resources and enhance the overall operational capacity of the EMB.

Fourth, examining the work experience of appointees reveals a clear logic of expertise transfer. The newly established EMBs maintain direct operational ties to predecessor bodies, most notably the work safety supervision bureaus, as well as to existing departments such as public security. In particular, the EMBs fully absorbed the functions of the former work safety bureaus. It is therefore common for the inaugural director of an EMB to have previously served as the head of the local work safety bureau. Other relevant departments, especially public security, also serve as important sources of leadership. Appointing officials from these backgrounds facilitates the transfer of crucial professional expertise, for instance in accident investigation and emergency response, and enables a more effective transition into emergency management leadership roles.

Finally, the tenure of inaugural EMB directors is on average shorter than that of their counterparts in established agencies. This is likely due to the urgency of the institutional reform itself, suggesting that longevity is not a priority in selecting leaders for new departments and that the first appointment carries a distinct transitional nature. This phenomenon may also be related to the particularly demanding and high-pressure nature of emergency management work. EMB directors bear significant responsibility during crises, requiring sustained vigilance and resilience, which can lead to considerable stress and consequently contribute to a higher turnover rate.

5. SUMMARY

In summary, based on the data analysis of inaugural directors at China's prefectural Emergency Management Bureaus, the underlying appointment logic can be summarized as follows. Appointees are predominantly older male officials of Han ethnicity with strong local ties, while in ethnic regions, minority officials are appointed in accordance with local conditions. To ensure stability during the agency's foundational phase, the vast majority of inaugural directors are members of the Chinese Communist Party. While a bachelor's degree or higher is typically required to meet a baseline standard, educational background does not emerge as a primary determinant in the selection process. By contrast, prior professional experience in related fields, such as work safety regulation or public security, significantly increases the likelihood of appointment. Furthermore, due to the urgency of the institutional reform and the specific demands of emergency response work, the tenure of these inaugural directors tends to be shorter than that of their counterparts in pre-existing departments.

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