What Has the Chip War Brought to China's Chip Market?

Yining Zhao

doi:10.62051/ijsspa.v6n2.21

Authors

Yining Zhao

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.62051/ijsspa.v6n2.21

Keywords:

Chip War, Huawei, SMIC, Sanctions, Semiconductors

Abstract

This study examines the escalating chip war between China and the United States, focusing on the impact of the chip war on the Chinese chip market. Through the case studies of Huawei and SMIC, this paper argues that although the chip war has brought obstacles and blows to China's chip market and enterprises in some aspects, from an overall perspective, the chip war has promoted the process of China's self-research and development of chip technology and the construction of domestic supply chain.

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