The Chinese Path to Mandatory Data Sharing among Platform Enterprises: A Perspective on the Localized Reconstruction of the Essential Facilities Doctrine

Authors

  • Ke Li

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.62051/ijsspa.v10n1.05

Keywords:

Essential Data, Essential Facilities Doctrine, Mandatory Data Sharing, Antitrust Law, Interoperability

Abstract

The deepening development of the digital economy has endowed critical data with significant infrastructural properties. However, the "walled gardens" constructed by dominant platforms through "data feedback loops" have increasingly become structural barriers to fair market competition. Against the backdrop of China's "Data Twenty Measures," which established the separation of data property rights, and the amendment of the Anti-Monopoly Law, the mechanical application of the traditional Essential Facilities Doctrine (EFD) faces dilemmas regarding innovation suppression and ambiguity in definition. This paper constructs a regulatory paradigm of "mandatory sharing," predicated on the logic of opening data as a "quasi-public facility." By introducing a tripartite criterion consisting of "ecological non-substitutability," "public necessity," and "technical interoperability," this study reconstructs the constituent elements of essential data. Furthermore, based on the source of value and competitive attributes, it constructs a classified and hierarchical mechanism where "basic operational data" is subject to mandatory sharing in principle, while "derivative value-added data" is exempted in principle. The research demonstrates that establishing a pricing system based on FRAND principles and a "penetrating" algorithmic supervision mechanism can not only break the monopolistic loop of "data feudalism" but also effectively protect innovation incentives through trade secret defenses. This approach offers a distinct institutional scheme with Chinese characteristics for global digital market governance.

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References

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Published

2026-01-29

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Section

Articles

How to Cite

Li, K. (2026). The Chinese Path to Mandatory Data Sharing among Platform Enterprises: A Perspective on the Localized Reconstruction of the Essential Facilities Doctrine. International Journal of Social Sciences and Public Administration, 10(1), 32-43. https://doi.org/10.62051/ijsspa.v10n1.05